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Abstract- 
 
This paper explores the links between trade, conflict and peace in the Arab 
Maghreb countries. Since its creation in 1989, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
has been in a lethargic state. We assume that reducing inter and intra-state 
conflicts would be a sound argument for the reactivation of the Arab Maghreb 
Union. In this paper, we will discuss trade flows between the Maghreb Union 
countries and highlight the pending political issues and conflicts. The results 
confirm that countries which are more likely to create regional blocks are naturally 
more open to trade and even more subject to interstate disputes. Elimination of all 
trade barriers and putting into effect multilateral trading systems would enable 
AMU countries the creation of a regional security framework that leverages 
diplomatic, political, economic and even military resources. Regional integration 
can be built and strengthened in order to promote peace and stability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between international trade and security has been long known for 
centuries. Statistical analysis largely supports this relationship while international 
economic theories argue that more trade reduces, increases, or does not affect 
interstate military conflicts.                     
The paper is in line with previous research which considers that the type of conflict 
and the neighborhood relationships between countries have an impact on trade 
flows. This impact differs according to whether a country is a member of a regional 
trade agreement or not. Indeed, several regional agreements can be interpreted as 
being essentially motivated by political and security interests.  
In the current security context, the stabilizing effect of regional trading blocks 
seems relevant. Political and security motives contribute to the convergence of 
objectives while setting up regional agreements.  
The following paper studies the nature of the links between trade, conflict and 
peace in a sample of Arab Maghreb Union countries; Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia. An interesting feature of the sample is that these countries 
are experiencing important political and economic changes. It is worthy to note that 
among the barriers facing AMU is the recurring inter-state conflicts between its 
member states.     
                                      
We have noted similar security threats like new forms of terrorism1, nationalism 
and religious fundamentalism. These states become more vulnerable to the tactics 
used by terrorist groups. In founding the AMU, it was considered relevant that its 
regional institutions will be more appropriate for making field decisions when 
national decisions are unfit to respond to problems.   
The aim of this paper is to discuss whether regional agreements aiming at 
intensifying trade flows in the Maghreb region can contribute to an effective 
approach to security problems. We will try to answer the following question: Do 
trade regional agreements reduce conflicts? 
 
                                                 
1 Transnational terrorism is a substitute to traditional violence between countries and thus offers an additional 
challenge to international security.   
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The relationship between trade and conflicts has been a persistent source of 
controversy among international relations scholars and economic theorists. 
Empirical studies on this issue have focused on the effects of trade flows on 
conflicts. Nonetheless, they have ignored the institutional context in which trade is 
conducted. Several economic and trade arrangements have been established with 
the explicit purpose of preventing conflicts between or within states. Regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) can play a role in promoting good governance mechanisms 
such as budget transparency, careful tax management and independent legislature, 
policy and practice.  
Liberal economists claim that RTAs build stability and promote peace. However, in 
some circumstances RTAs may even increase odds for instability and conflicts both 
within and between countries. 
In the first section of this article, we review the theoretical and empirical findings 
on the link between trade and conflict and especially the influence of regional 
trading agreements on conflict.  
                                      
The second section examines the trade-peace-conflict link in the Arab Maghreb 
Union countries. The choice of the AMU region is motivated by its geostrategic 
and political importance, the birth place of the so-called Arab spring. The 
concluding section attempts clarify the nature of the relationship between conflict 
and trade. 
2.  Theoretical Overview on the Relationship between Conflict and Trade: 
Polachek and Seiglie (2007) confirm that there is a negative and a robust 
relationship between conflict and trade. Countries engaged in many trade 
exchanges have less conflicts. If conflict leads to reduced levels of trade, there 
would be fewer conflicts because of welfare losses and the indirect costs of such 
disputes. 
Martin et al. (2010) refer to the "liberal peace"2 argument, which considers that 
bilateral trade reduces the likelihood of a bilateral war. As a result, trade 
agreements should reduce a potential conflict between countries because they trade 
with each other. This argument bears on the idea that bilateral trade increases the 
opportunity cost of war and armed conflict3. These latter would destroy the gains 
                                                 
2 Liberal peace focuses “not just on domestic political institutions and their international implications, but on the 
character of peace in civil and societal, political, economic, security, and international spheres” (Richmond, 
2011). 
3 Armed conflict is defined as "a contested incompatibility that a government and / or a territory and where the 
use of armed force between the two parties, at least one of which is the government of a State, less than 25 
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from trade. Without trade gains, the economic opportunity cost of war is lower. The 
authors also found that countries that experienced a number of conflicts in the past 
are more likely to endorse regional trade agreements. In fact, the last two decades’ 
war had a negative impact on the likelihood of States to ratify a regional free trade 
agreement. This is because it is politically costly and difficult for countries in 
conflict to negotiate a free trade agreement.  The opposite effect of wars on the 
likelihood of signing a free trade agreement suggests that peace time between 
former enemies should be exploited to conclude regional agreements and build 
more peaceful relationships. This result is in line with the work of Schiff & Winters 
(1998) and Bearce (2003) who show that regional trade agreements prevent 
escalation of conflicts as proposed by the "diplomatic regionalism"4 notion, and by 
Mansfield & Pevehouse (2002), Bearce & Omori (2005) and Haftel (2007) who 
showed that regional trade agreements reduce the probability of war between 
member countries. 
According to Bach (1995)5 "The prerequisite for any establishment of regional 
integration lies in the easing of conflicts in order to stem insecurity". 
Trade reduces interstate tensions and ensures promotion of peace: 
- by supporting trade between its members which increases the opportunity cost of 
war (Martin et al., 2008); 
- by increasing trust between management and the credibility of the commitments 
of states in the regional process. Regional institutions promote conflict resolution in 
a peaceful manner (Bearce, 2003). 
 
In his “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace”, Bearce (2003) argues that 
trade agreements promote peaceful resolution of conflicts and prevent their 
escalation and the outbreak of war. The author carried out an analysis of 
opportunity costs and concluded that regionalism increases trade gains while 
conflicts disrupt bilateral trade. He recommends the establishment of a 
supranational authority with more prerogatives to deal with crises and called for 
developed mechanisms for dispute settlement in order to increase trust between 
political leaders.  
                                                                                                                                                        
deaths in a battle in one year. A conflict between two belligerents, one at least is the government of a state. In 
inter-state conflicts, the two main parts are the state governments (according to the definition of the UCDP 
[Uppsala Conflict Data Program], Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Sweden). 
4 L. Alan Winters 8, Maurice Schiff, 1997 "Regional Integration As Diplomacy" World Bank WPs No. 1801. 
5 Daniel C. Bach 9, 1995 "The crisis of IGOs or the imperative of reform scenarios and models of integration: 
the case of West Africa ", p. 27. 
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3. Distance, Trade and Conflict 
Robst et al. (2007) examined the interactive effect of distance and trade on 
international conflicts. Geographically close countries experience more conflicts 
and wars than geographically distant countries.  
According to Vasquez (1995), several reasons explain this relationship. First, 
distant countries do not like fighting one another, mainly because military 
operations are costly in distant countries. This is particularly relevant for small or 
less developed countries. Second, geographically close countries have several 
territorial disputes leading to conflicting behavior. These territorial disputes 
generally relate to natural resources (Barbieri & Petersen, 2001). Finally, 
geographically close countries interact more because of their proximity. 
This approach contradicts the neo-liberal argument, which assumes that trade 
between neighboring countries reduces rivalries and conflicts. 
This is paradoxical: on the one hand, geographical proximity intensifies conflicts; 
on the other hand, this proximity is intended to strengthen trade relations, which, 
according to neoliberals reduce the occurrence of conflicts. 
Polachek (1992) adopted an economic approach to international political 
interactions in order to study the relationship between politics and trade. The author 
found that an increase in trade flows by 1% decreases conflicts from 0.19% to 
0.15%. He concludes that trade affects political conflicts and cooperation. 
Mansfield and Pollins (2001) argue that "too little effort has been made to 
determine whether the relationship of interdependence and conflict is limited by 
space...". They show that geographical proximity increases the occurrence of 
conflicts. Their results suggest that wars would be expensive for very distant 
countries and that geographical proximity increases rivalry and disputes. On the 
contrary, Robst et al. (2007) argue that trade reduces conflict caused by 
geographical proximity. They show how geography and trade interact to influence 
international interdependencies. Likewise, Martin et al. (2007) shed light on the 
fact that war containment is translated into trade increase.  
4. Regionalism, Peace and Conflict: 
4.1 Relevance of the Political and Institutional Dimensions: 
Insecurity is the inability of states to react to challenges that threaten their 
citizens. According to Hettne and Söderbaum (2000), the definition of insecurity is 
no longer limited to the military aspect but encompasses political, economic, social, 
cultural and environmental threats. 
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Schiff and Winters (1998) consider that trade agreements between neighboring 
countries ensure security by increasing trust between people and between 
leaders. The authors consider that each member country will be involved in 
increasing the welfare of its neighbor and thus be able to access its strategic 
resources. Regional agreements have a political motive since they contribute to a 
"political rapprochement" between country members. 
 
Bonzom, Sopanha and Strauss-Kahn (2005) examined the link between economic 
integration and political integration, as well as the endogenous nature of the 
integration process. Strong regional political institutions can be a factor behind 
promoting the integration process. In addition to institutions, common rules and 
procedures may play an essential role in accelerating this process. Dorrucci et 
al. (2002) examined the positive interaction between institutional integration and 
economic integration in Europe and Latin America. They concluded that these two 
processes go hand in hand. Political commitment, supported by an institutional 
support and economic growth, has contributed to ensuring security. De Melo et 
al. (1993) put forward the idea that regional trade agreements are no longer 
considered as mere agreements reducing trade barriers but also as institutional 
arrangements that promote cooperation. Barriers to integration have been overcome 
in regional groupings, thanks to a strong political will and institutional 
arrangements. These regional institutions offer several mechanisms which can 
mitigate violent conflicts. In this respect, it is not surprising that the highest degree 
of integration and stability is observed in Europe and is supplemented by a very 
strong institutional integration. 
4.2. Impact of Regionalism on Security and Stability:   
The thesis of the "peaceful impact" of regionalism goes back to the work of 
Emmanuel Kant in 1795, when Europe was torn by wars after the French 
Revolution6. 
Regional security refers to the set of provisions taken by States in the same region 
to face the threats posed on them, in particular with the emergence of new forms of 
threats (terrorism, piracy, poverty, pollution ...). 
According to K. Waltz, the international scene is "an arena where States in the 
interests of their national interest maximize their power". As such, the presence of a 
hostile power leads a group of States to cooperate to confront the “common 
enemy”. In this line of thinking, we can argue that national interests can be 
progressively replaced by common regional interests. 
                                                 
6 Kant introduced the concept of ‘spirit of commerce” which give all state an interest in preventing war and 
promoting peace.  
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"The concepts of security indicate the preservation of state integrity in terms of 
norms, institutions and values, faced with an external threat [...], security of a State 
is defined essentially in terms of an absence of military threat". 
K. Deutsch (1954) examined the political conditions prevailing during the 
formation of an integration region by studying thirty-three historical case. This 
historical approach highlighted the concept of " security communities". 
In line with Deutsch (1954), Bonzom, Sopanha and Strauss-Kahn, (2005) suggest 
that institutions help create "a virtuous circle of a regional integration 
process ". They provide for a dynamic integration process. This analysis is in the 
same spirit of neo-functionalist theorists (Mattli, 1999 and Moravcsik, 2005) who 
identify three effects that come along a regional process: 
- a functional contagion effect resulting from interdependence between economic 
sectors, 
- political contagion, 
- compromise on cross-cutting issues that require the regional institution to monitor 
trade-offs between member States. 
The authors consider that regional institutions are able to compensate those which 
they call "losers" by supporting economic convergence among member countries. 
5. Assessing the Relationship between Trade and Conflict: The Case of the 
AMU Region 
The five countries forming the AMU are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia. They have had a common colonial history and a shared struggle against 
the French and Italian colonizers. Since their independence, several disputes have 
taken place. It is worthy to note that there is a security dilemma between these 
countries. 
5.1. General Overview of Maghreb Disputes 
The disputes between AMU countries relate to the inherited borders from the 
colonial period and are maintained by the different political and socio-economic 
options adopted by the states of the region. 
Several facts of historical animosity characterize relationships between Maghreb 
countries. Historically, the union was founded by three main states: Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia. Mauritania represented a link to Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Border problems bear on most tensions and conflicts between Maghreb 
countries. Morocco and Tunisia have contested the boundaries mapped out by the 
French colonizer and defended by Algeria. "The more borders a country has, the 
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more enemies it has, this the case of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania and possibly 
Libya". 
Morocco’s and Mauritania’s recovery of the Western Sahara7 from the Spanish 
colonizer has undermined all attempts to reunify the countries of the region. 
This major obstacle to Maghreb relationships stood against the vision of their 
political leaders, often supported by their people like in Algeria and Morocco.  
The conflict in the Sahara is one of the oldest unsolved issues. It dates back to the 
colonial heritage and the disputes that sparkled over the Saharan borders after the 
independence of Algeria and Morocco. In 1960, the resolution n°1514, adopted by 
the United Nations (UN), recognizes the right of people to self-determination.            
In 1963, the Organization of African Union (OAU) Charter calls on its members to 
respect the "intangibility of Colonial frontiers8". Morocco rejects this article and 
expresses the will to recover territories it owned in the South and West of Algeria 
before the French colonization. This dispute is at the origin of the “Guerre des 
sables” (war of sands), a conflict that lasted for a few weeks before being resolved 
through the mediation of the OAU. 
The Polisario is a political movement founded in 1973 whose objective is the 
independence of Western Sahara, still under Spanish control. It is the main 
opponent to Morocco claiming the sovereignty of the former Spanish colony of 
Western Sahara.  The Polisario struggle for self-determination is approved and 
supported by Algeria. The occupation of the disputed territory by Morocco in 1975 
triggered wars9 which lasted for 16 years. Morocco had claimed land belonging to 
Algeria (Tindouf, Bechar and other Saharan Africa).  Algeria defended the right to 
self-determination and hindered Moroccan ambitions. 
The Organization for African Unity has declared a cease-fire on November 5, 1963. 
Even if the armed intervention ceased, the germs of the conflict persisted and have 
since then deteriorated interstate relations. A peace treaty was signed in Ifrane in 
1969 followed by another in Telmcen in 1970, and have brought an end to border 
disputes.  
 
A second border conflict tainted Tunisian and Algerian relations. The conflict 
started on the border stone n°233. In fact, Tunisia claimed that that border edge was 
conceived by the colonizer as part of the Tunisian Saharan space.  
 
                                                 
7 Territory 260000km2 and rich in phosphates and fronting Atlantic. 
8 See article 4 (b) of the Constitutive Act Of The African Union  https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-
file-constitutiveact_en.pdf  
9 On October 8, 1963, the “War of sands” between Algeria and Morocco. 
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Table 1: General Overview of Maghreb Disputes (1957 to 198910) 
Period 
 
Belligerent 
Countries 
Number of 
Dead * 
Specifications 
1957-1958 
Mauritania -
Morocco 
> 1,000 deaths 
directly related to the 
conflict 
Interstate War (border conflict) 
5 August 1979 Mauritania  
Mauritania occupied the southern part of Western 
Sahara in 1975, following the withdrawal of 
Spain, in August 1979. After a three-year war of 
attrition against the Polisario, a struggling 
movement for the independence of Western 
Sahara started. 
 1962  Tunisia-Algeria  
Tunisia claims a portion of territory in Algeria 
going as far as the « border stone 233 »  
1963 - 1964 
Algeria- 
Morocco 
> 1,000 War between states (border conflict) 
1975-1989 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
> 15,000 deaths 
directly linked to the 
conflict 
War between the two states and civil war 
Mid  70’s Libya -Tunisia   
Libya challenges Tunisia's rights on the 
continental sheet of the Gulf of Gabes, rich in oil 
1973 
Libya- Chad -  
Niger - Algeria  
-- 
Colonel Gaddafi annexed Aouzou, which was part 
of Chad and in 1976 boasts 96,200 km2 of Chad, 
19,500 km2 of Niger and the same area in 
Algeria. In addition, he challenged Tunisia on the 
rights of the Gulf of Gabes. 
1980 Libya -Tunisia 
    48 dead 
 
The events of Gafsa: the attack of Gafsa in 1980 
and the expulsion of nearly 50 000 Tunisian 
workers from Libya between 1975 and 1985. 
* Estimates. 
Source: compiled by the author from "Perspective World 2016" of the University Sherbrooke and the 2014 and 
2015 reports of the Institute for Economic Peace. 
 
 
By the end of the 1960s, territorial conflicts seemed to be reabsorbed.                       
Indeed, Morocco renounces the annexation of Mauritania since 1969, with the 
ratification of a Treaty of Good Neighborhood and Economic Cooperation between 
the two countries on June 8, 1970. Hassan II signs the renunciation of Tindouf and 
Béchar on 27 May 1970. During the 1980s, Libya abandoned all its claims. It no 
longer claims the Ghat in Algeria and recognizes Tunisia's sovereignty over the 
continental sheet of the Gulf of Gabes, at the end of an arbitration by the 
International Court of Justice of The Hague. Tunisia, for its part, renounces all 
territorial claims with regard to Algeria. The two countries sign a boundary mark 
followed by a treaty of fraternity and concord, on March 19, 1983. 
                                                 
10 1989 is the founding date of the AMU. 
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In its 2016 report, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) assesses the cost of 
peacekeeping. In Table 2 below, we report the data for the five countries in the 
AMU region. 
Table 2: Peacekeeping Costs for Countries in the AMU Region 
Rank 
 
Country 
Cost (millions $ 
in PPA) 
Cost / head ($) 
 
%GDP 
5 Libya 20.395 3,173 19.6% 
26 Mauritania 750.000 210 9.1% 
27 Algeria 25.775 715 9.0% 
81 Morocco 8.375 260 4.6% 
91 Tunisia 4.430 410 4.1% 
Source: The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 2015 "The Economic Cost of Violence Containment " 
P.14 
 
The political and security dimension seems relevant when founding the Maghreb 
area. The revival of Maghreb regionalism would make leaders aware that under 
geopolitical conditions, fostering security should be considered. This can be done 
through regional cooperation through increased institutional cooperation.  
This may be seen as a response to the fact that new security threats are regional 
security matters; the security of a member country depends on the security of other 
countries. 
This principle was specified in the Treaty11 establishing the Arab Maghreb Union 
concluded in Marrakesh on February 17th, 1989. Article fourteen stipulates that 
"Any aggression directed against one of the member States shall be considered as 
an aggression against the other member States." Moreover, Article fifteen states 
that "Member States pledge not to permit on their territory any activity or 
organization liable to threaten the security, the territorial integrity or the political 
system of any of them. They also pledge to abstain from joining any alliance or 
military or political block directed against the political independence or territorial 
integrity of the other member States. They also undertake to refrain from joining 
any covenant or military or political alliance directed against the political 
independence or territorial unity of the other member States.  
5.2 Intra-Maghreb Trade 
 
Maghreb countries have poor trade relations compared to other regional blocks. 
Indeed, the regional integration rate of the AMU is 3.9%, whereas it is 65% for the 
EU, 25% for ASEAN and 14% for MERCOSUR (World Bank 2006). 
                                                 
11 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/fr/regeco_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=201318  
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The economic structure of the region rests on raw materials and very little 
processed commodities. The share of manufacturing products in Maghreb trade has 
decreased compared to commodities (31.5% in 2012 against 44.7% in 2009). These 
commodities are mainly fuel (52.7% of the intraregional trade is made up of fuel 
and natural gas). Algeria and Libya dominate with over 55% of intra-Maghreb 
trade. Morocco represents only 10% of the Maghreb market. Its exports are more 
than 62% of manufacturing products. Tunisia has lost its dominant position in favor 
of Algeria since 2011 because of the post-2011 political and institutional 
instability. Mauritania’s share of intra-UMA trade decreased ten-fold between 2006 
and 2012, from 0.69% to 0.06% in 2012, mainly agricultural products. 
Even though the region has made a positive evolution in trade flows, the latter 
remain insufficient and directed towards a single commercial partner namely the 
European Union. The World Bank has identified some obstacles that explain the 
weakness of trade flows between AMU countries. The first is "trade costs" because 
supply chains are inadequate (cost, delay, reliability) as well as tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. In addition, the IMF has shown that customs barriers in the Maghreb are 
twice as high as the world average: 19.2% for Algeria, 26.2% for Morocco and 
31.7% for Tunisia). Despite a large seafront, the North African harbor facilities are 
inadequate and their administration is typically disorganized creating delays and 
longer container clearance periods (20 days in Algiers, 18 in Radés and 11 days in 
Casablanca12).  
To overcome these shortcomings, AMU member countries are expected to 
cooperate in order to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, to adopt clear and 
transparent regulations and to simplify administrative procedures, in particular 
through the use of telecommunication technologies and bureaucracy reduction. 
Countries are called upon to respond to the WTO initiative for trade facilitation and 
"the simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures". These are 
the "activities, practices and formalities related to the collection, presentation, 
communication and processing of information required for the international 
exchange of goods". The WTO intends through this program to "reduce 
bureaucracy and speed up customs clearance and port authorizations". All of these 
reforms should be accompanied by measures to counteract corruption and build 
political stability and regional security. Resolving disputes and conflicts through 
trade promotion and harmonization is essential for Maghreb countries. 
                                                 
12 The AMU countries are poorly ranked according to the World Bank "Doing Business 2015" 
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5. 3. Methodology and Model Specification 
We are interested in studying the effect of regional trading integration on military 
conflicts. Our hypothesis is that security is a factor that facilitates the creation of a 
regional trading block. Conflicts are linked not only to trade, but also to trade 
partnership models. 
 
The used model regresses the effect of forming a regional block on the occurrence 
of conflicts, like in Bayane (2014).  The following model is adopted in our study: 
 
Y ijt = α + β 1 (nBorder) + β 2 (Totalac) + β 3 (Mtot) + β 4 (Rtot) + μ ijt 
 
Where: Y is the endogenous variable ijt "Conflict", which is a dichotomous variable 
that takes the following values: 
           Yijt = 1 if countries i and j are engaged in a conflict on date t 
                  = 0 otherwise. 
Referring to previous research that examined the relationship between conflicts, 
trade and geographical distance, as well as the stylized facts, we selected the 
following variables that explain the potential effect of interstate conflict. 
 
The used variables13 in this study are as follows: 
- nBorder: expresses the number of neighboring states sharing a border with the 
identified state. We have introduced this variable in order to capture the border 
effects in regional relations. 
The literature review shows that this variable increases the risk of triggering a 
conflict between neighboring countries. 
- Totalac: represents the sum of all the main episodes of political violence taken 
from the MEPV database. 
These events include civil and inter-state violence between all neighboring 
States. We chose this variable to assess the effect of instability of neighboring 
countries on regional conflicts. Instability in neighboring countries positively 
impacts the probability of the occurrence of a conflict. 
- M tot: are the terms of multilateral exchanges that express exchange reports from 
each country in the region with the rest of the world.  
Multilateral trade reduces the risk of conflict in a region (Martin et al. 2008). 
                                                 
13  We kept the nomenclature and codes adopted by the database MEPV, 2016. 
(1) 
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- Rtot: express terms of regional trade and indicate regional trade 
relations. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2002), Bearce and Omori (2005), among 
others, showed that trade reduces the likelihood of wars and conflicts in a region. 
5.4. The Data 
Defense spending is commonly used as a measure of conflict and as an indicator of 
the general hostility sentiment in a country. However, these expenses could be 
considered as average deterrent measures against other countries. Defense spending 
is also seen as a measure of suppression of domestic unrest. The use of this 
indicator is limited because it does not reflect the extent and type of conflict. War 
data are better because they are more informative about a particular conflict. 
Although wars are intense and rare, interstate interaction data on the number of 
deaths or injuries vary with technology and country size. 
Because of these shortcomings, event data are adopted. Event data are dyadic 
interactions (bilateral) reported in various newspapers. The main database of this 
type is "Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB14)". 
The events are coded on a scale of fifteen points representing different types of 
conflict and cooperation. The annual incidence of events in each category 
represents the amount of each interaction of dyadic actor/target. However, event 
data do not cover secret treaties and negotiations, as well as interstate interactions.  
  
Our dependent variable is taken from the project database "Correlates of War 
(COW), and the Dyadic MID Dataset (v 3.02) as well as the Major Episodes of 
Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2015 database15. 
According to the COW project, war is defined as a conflict with at least 1,000 
military deaths. 
Finally, terms of trade are taken from UNCTAD for the period 1990-2014. 
 
5.5. Empirical Results 
The model is globally significant; there are two variables in our model that explain 
the probability of a conflict: Mtot and Totalac variables are significant at the 5% 
level. 
                                                 
14  This is a longitudinal collection of about 1 million events reported daily by forty-seven journalistic sources 
between 1948 and 1978. Each level of conflict (Military Interstate Disputes MID) is encoded with a level of 
hostility from 1 to 5 (1 = militarized No action 2 = threat to use force, 3 = Strength display, 4 = use of force, and 
5 = war). 
15 18 Monty G. Marshall (2016) "Major Episodes Of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions", 1946 
2015, Center for Systemic Peace May 25, 2016.  
This recent database includes 327 episodes of armed conflicts (including 30 cases) that represent a complete set 
of all major forms of armed conflict worldwide during the contemporary period: 1946-2012. 
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As expected, Totalac indicates that unrest in neighboring states destabilizes the 
countries of the region. 
Our empirical analysis, based on country data of the AMU region, Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia from 1990 to 2014, confirms that an increase in 
multilateral trade interdependence and open regional trade within AMU greatly 
promotes peace.  
It also indicates that this effect varies with the country’s geographic proximity.  
The results of the estimates and their economic interpretation are presented below: 
 
Table 3: Estimated Determinants of the Probability of Occurrence of a Conflict. 
Dependent variable: conflict likelihood (= 1 if there is a conflict, = 0 otherwise) 
 
 Coef. z p> |𝑧| 
Confidence interval 95% 
 
nBORDER 0.052277 0.11      0.915 - 0.9087551 1.013309 
Totalac 2.433706 3.14 0.02 0.9154219 3.95199 
Mtot - 0.0408 -2.43 0.015 - 0.0737496 - 0.0078504 
Rtot - 0.0019735 -0.40 0.693 - 0.0117607 0.0078137 
constant 1.346734 0.41 0.680 -5.054536 7.748004 
 
The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the expected signs and corroborate 
our theoretical developments. Trade relations reduce the risk of conflict between 
countries. However, we note that multilateral relations have more impact on 
reducing conflicts, a finding consistent with those of Robst et al. (2007) and 
Polachek (1992). 
The border is a factor that intensifies interstate conflict. These results confirm the 
historical stylized facts we presented in the previous section and show that 
most conflicts (armed or extreme tensions) trigger border disputes. Political 
instability in a country undermines peace, security and political stability in the 
region. We insist here on the fundamental role of the instruments to promote 
regional security and stability. 
The effect of promoting peace through regional trade integration is significantly 
higher for neighboring countries which are likely to suffer from conflicts. 
The analysis shows that increasing global trade openness reduces the likelihood of 
a significant conflict for both distant and neighboring countries. The results also 
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show that a military conflict between countries significantly reduces 
interdependence not only for bilateral trade but also for multilateral trade 
integration. 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations  
Regionalism seems to be an adequate strategy for the security and stability of the 
Maghreb States. Eliminating all trade barriers and engaging in a multilateral trade 
system would allow AMU countries to facilitate the creation of a regional security 
framework using diplomatic, political, economic and even military means.  
We recommend also that these countries should promote cultural exchanges and 
regional political associations. 
We believe that by reactivating AMU, the actions of its regional institutions are in a 
better position to take decisions in areas where domestic institutions are unable to 
solve problems. Regional flexibility is larger than national rigidity and it allows for 
delegating responsibilities and sharing costs. 
Maghreb countries’ reluctance to reactivate AMU can be explained by their fear to 
diffuse their sovereignty and power regionally. Additionally, there is a lack of 
willingness to invest in the regional process and a disinterest in setting up regional 
structures despite persistent destabilization threats. 
Discredited in their ambitions for forming the Arab Maghreb Union, weakened by 
the growth of the informal sector, and facing political instability and terrorist 
threats, AMU States are less willing to accept the transfer of their sovereignty. 
Regionalism is a complex phenomenon where several dimensions interact: 
economic, political, social, and technological. 
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